This paper extends previous work on the modal logic CK as a reference system, both proof-theoretically and model-theoretically, for a correspondence theory of constructive modal logics. First, the fundamental nature of CK is discussed and compared with the intuitionistic modal logic IK which is traditionally taken to be the base line. Then, it is shown, that CK admits of a cut-free Gentzen sequent calculus G-CK which has (i) a local interpretation in constructive Kripke models and (ii) does not require explicit world labels. Finally, the paper demonstrates how non-classical modal logics such as IK, CS4, CL, or Masini's deontic system of 2-sequents arise as theories of CK, presented both as special rules and as frame classes.
Introduction
Arguably one of the most intriguing modal theories, one which has created a world of its own, is intuitionistic logic. It has first been conceived (Glivenko, Kolmogorov, Heyting) as a formalisation of constructive reasoning rejecting the principle of the Excluded Middle and was later identified (Gödel, Kripke) as a fragment of Lewis' S4 modal system which strengthens classical implication C → D by (hereditary) necessity C ⊃ D = 2(C → D) using an S4-type 2 modality. Intuitionistic logic has widespread applications in the constructive foundations of Mathematics as well as in Computer Science where the close connection between proofs and computations has set off a rich body of work on λ-calculi and type theories for programming languages. These exploit the fundamental correspondence, known as the Curry-Howard Isomorphism, which permits us to interpret proofs of constructive implications C ⊃ D as functional λ-programs computing values of type D from values of type C . The simply-typed λ-calculus [1] which is isomorphic to the proof algebra of intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL) is the archetypal example from which many powerful extensions have been generated such as System F or the Calculus of Constructions.
Intuitionistic logic is an implicit modal theory encapsulating a notion of constructive proof and computation. It is natural to add modal operators on top of it to capture further intensional aspects of computation. Indeed the study of intuitionistic modal logic and specifically of modal type theories has attracted a lot of interest. The two most well-known modalised type theories are variations of computational type theory which go back to the work of Moggi [2] and variations of modal type theory initiated by Kobayashi [3] , Pfenning & Wong [4] and Bierman & De Paiva [5] .
Without Excluded Middle and the classical double negation duality we are looking at independent 2 and 3 modalities which may or may not have related interpretations. Defining axioms for one operator does not necessarily determine the properties of the other. While the necessity modalities are well understood, matters are not so clear cut regarding the possibility modality. Indeed, there seems to be a basic divide between intuitionistic modal logics and modal type theories ✩ This work is funded by the German Research Council (DFG) as part of the project SPACMoDL grant No. ME 1427/4-1.
regarding the behaviour of 3 and the question of what should be considered the constructive equivalent of system K. In the following we discuss the issue and then pin down the contribution of this paper.
Intuitionistic K versus constructive K
The traditional approach in intuitionistic modal logics is to dualise the standard algebraic characterisation of 2 as a monotonic ∧-preserving operator of intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL) and to define 3 as a monotonic ∨-preserving modality. There are two equivalent axiomatisations of this idea, Plotkin and Stirling's IK [6, 7] and Fischer-Servi's system [8] , called FS in [9] : Like classical K, the logic IK/FS admits of an elementary Kripke style model theory and various extensions, such as IS4, IS4.3, IS5, may be rendered in terms of characteristic frame classes [6] . The system IK/FS arises from the standard intuitionistic semantics of the propositional connectives and the interpretation of 2, 3 as universal and existential quantifiers over accessible worlds in an intuitionistic meta-theory:
x | 2C iff ∀y.x y ⇒ ∀z.y R z ⇒ z | C (1)
where R is the modal accessibility relation and a reflexive and transitive refinement relation capturing a notion of partial information increase. In intuitionistic logic all propositions must be closed under refinement, i.e., x | C and x y implies y | C . For this to hold under definition (2) of 3, the models of IK/FS need to satisfy confluence between and R, i.e., the frame condition −1 ; R ⊆ R ; −1 where ; denotes composition of relations. Many results on these intuitionistic variants of normal modal logics may be derived from the fact that they can be embedded into the classical two-dimensional modal logic
However, there is something odd about the "normal" interpretation. First, it is unsatisfactory that the Kripke semantics for the basic system should already require a frame condition connecting the modal and intuitionistic dimensions. The semantics given in [9] even reduces (1) back to the classical condition x | 2C iff ∀z.y R z ⇒ z | C in favour of introducing yet another frame condition, ; R ⊆ R ; . Such frame conditions indicate that we are not in a free and irredundant settheoretic representation. Instead, IK/FS looks more like a special theory relative to some more elementary class of models. Furthermore, definition (2) is not only in need of a frame condition, it is also directly responsible for the axioms FS4/IK4 as well as FS5/IK5, which are not unproblematic from a constructive point of view.
First, take the axiom FS4/IK4 of Disjunctive Distribution, viz. 3(A ∨ B) ⊃ (3A ∨ 3B) generated by the confluence frame condition −1 ; R ⊆ R ; −1 :
• Although confluence is natural for monotonic accessibility functions R, it is not for accessibility relations. Suppose R models a non-deterministic choice arising from partiality of information: For some computational object or state x there may be two options of successors x R y 1 and x R y 2 which are undecided because of lack of information about x. After refining x to x by additional information, i.e., x x , this information deficit might be resolved so that the option x R y 1 is no longer applicable. In this case, we may not even have x R y 1 for any refinement of y 1 y 1 , as the confluence of R and would require.
• Suppose 3C means "in some context C ". We may well be able to construct a proof which is guaranteed to decide A ∨ B "in some context" but this does not mean we can construct a proof of 3A ∨ 3B which would have to decide outright whether 3A or 3B holds, i.e., whether "in some context" A or "in some context" B is true. This is problematic if the decision between A and B in 3(A ∨ B) depends on the contextual circumstances. If contextual reasoning involves expending computational resources then the decision A ∨ B can only be constructed by actually entering the context and thus cannot be anticipated.
• If 3 reads "true in classical logic" it would certainly be constructive to assume 3(A ∨ ¬A) but not 3A ∨ 3¬A. Or take 3 to mean "under normal circumstances": It would seem easy to maintain constructively that 3(I'll show up at 7am ∨ I'll call you) but rather difficult to decide whether 3 I'll show up at 7am or 3 I'll call you is true.
Contextual interpretations of 3 have been considered by Curry in the 50ies [10] and it is well-known [11] that these do not satisfy Disjunctive Distribution. Presumably the first to explicitly argue this case was Wijesekera [12, 13] who observed that the natural interpretation of 3 in constructive concurrent dynamic logic (CCDL) does not satisfy FS4/IK4. The same applies to the Beth-Kripke-Joyal cover semantics of modalities [14] which implement a notion of local truth familiar from topos theory. The lack of distribution is typical for modal type theories, specifically modal logics under the judgemental reconstruction of Pfenning [15, 16] .
Similar problems arise in the interaction between 3 and 2 exhibited by scheme IK5/FS5 which stems from the semantic clause (2) . The following examples suggest there may not be a universal computational justification for the implication
• Again read 3C generically as "in some context C " and 2C as "in all contexts C ". The precondition 3A ⊃ 2B amounts to a construction that gives a proof of B in all contexts under the assumption that A holds in some context. This does not universally warrant the conclusion 2(A ⊃ B) that in all contexts the assumption A would entail B. Say, if we take "context" to mean "accessible economic context". We might be able to realise the statement "3(financial funds are available) ⊃ 2(humanitarian aid can be provided)" because in the current economic context we have a strategy to convert money from some accessible business context into food that can be used for humanitarian aid in all economic contexts, where needed. However, it is not guaranteed that in all accessible economic contexts where financial funds are available we could also provide humanitarian aid. For instance, under the conditions of the local context money cannot buy food if there is no-one who sells it.
• Let us take an interpretation from programming, related to CCDL and the realisability model of Kobayashi [3] • Nanevski [17] presents a modal lambda calculus where modality 2 S C specifies suspended expressions which read from a dynamic store S to produce values of type C while 3 S C types expressions that first destructively update the global store and then produce a value of type C in the updated store. In this system the evaluation of an expression of type 2 S (A ⊃ B) may depend on dynamic store but the resulting function of type A ⊃ B must be pure. Such a pure function from input A to output B cannot be produced from an expression of type 3 S A ⊃ 2 S B since the latter only provides a result of type 2 S B which is a suspended value of type B depending on the store rather than a pure value of type B.
Finally, consider the axiom FS3/IK3. It is known that fallible worlds, in which all propositions become true, need to be added to the intuitionistic Kripke models in order to admit of a constructive meta-theory [18] . Since IPL has no modalities such fallible worlds have no influence on the class of theorems. With modalities, however, this is no longer the case as fallible worlds may be accessible from non-fallible worlds through the modal relation R and so become 'visible' in the form of 3⊥ statements. Hence, with fallible worlds being present, the axiom FS3/IK3 is no longer valid. E.g., a proof/program of type 3 S ⊥ may be a non-terminating process which locks up while updating the store S, which should not canonically induce (through an axiom like FS3/IK3) a program of type ⊥ which locks up straight away.
It seems to us that in computational type theories [2, 19, 20] or modal type theories [3, 16, 17, 21] , where constructive proofs turn into λ-programs, the schemes FS3/IK3-FS5/IK5 fail to have a uniform computational justification. On the other hand, the schemes that do appear to be computationally justified are FS1/IK1, FS2/IK2 and FS6. Restricting to these axioms yields the constructive system known as CK [22, 23] with the two equivalent presentations: [12, 24, 25, 23] or topological semantics [26] . They are based on (1) for 2 and the stronger interpretation of 3 given as
to replace (2) . This forces 3C to be hereditary for refinement without a frame property. Also, this does away with schemes FS4/IK4 and FS5/IK5 which now turn into non-trivial frame properties generating proper extensions of CK. If we also add fallible worlds then FS3/IK3 is removed as well (see [23] ). Alternatively, as demonstrated in [27] , from a proof-theoretic perspective CK can be seen as a fragment of IK.
CK is well known [12] as a constructive modal logic where the modality is based on an accessibility relation between partial states of information. For instance, in CCDL [13] the accessibility relation acts on partial information about a complete machine state. CK is the natural modal structure of relational spaces, which are standard relational frames equipped with topologies [26] . Also, as indicated above, CK modalities arise from local notions of truth [14] .
Note that CK (without IK3/FS3) is not the intuitionistic analogue to classical K in the sense of Fischer-Servi and Simpson [7] since adding Excluded Middle C ∨ ¬C ≡ does not collapse the theory to give classical K.
It is an open question whether there exists a true analogue of K between CK and IK that is both constructively acceptable and returns classical K under Excluded Middle. It may even be doubted that such a constructive analogue exists, since the classical collapse criterion makes it impossible to give logical explanations for phenomena that are classically inconsistent but nevertheless constructively consistent. In any case, CK should be a reasonable common base point from which a correspondence theory for constructive modal logics can be attempted.
Towards a correspondence theory based on CK
Of course, all of the theories of IK/FS fall into the remits of a correspondence theory based on CK. Yet, there are theories of CK, which are not at the same time extensions of IK:
• the propositional fragment of Wijesekera's CCDL [12, 13] or the logic of modal frames [26] which are CK plus the IK3/FS3 axiom ¬3⊥; • the propositional fragment of Fitch's M [28] which is CK plus the T -axioms 2C ⊃ C , C ⊃ 3C ; • Masini's I-2SC theory [29] which is CK plus axiom ¬3⊥ and the deontic scheme 2C ⊃ 3C ;
• the S4-style modal type theory CS4 [3, 16, 25, 14] , which is CK plus the T -axioms 2C ⊃ C , C ⊃ 3C as well as the 4-axioms 2C ⊃ 22C , 3C ⊃ 33C ([3] also adds ¬3⊥); • Computational Logic (CL) [30, 11] , also known as propositional lax logic (PLL) [24, 14] , which extends CS4 by the axiom C ⊃ 2C . This collapses 2 and strengthens 3 to a modality equipped with the tensorial strength (C ∧ 3D) ⊃ 3(C ∧ D); • the S5-style modal type theory Lambda 5 [31] which employs the modalities 2 and 3 to express mobile code for distributed computations. The type system is developed as a judgemental sequent calculus following Martin-Löf's [32] notion of hypothetical judgements.
CK is a promising core system able to explain various constructive modal logics that have found applications in the literature as specialised semantic theories defined by frame classes. E.g., it is known how IK, CS4, PLL/CL arise from CK in terms of Kripke models [25] . However, a systematic CK correspondence theory has not yet been attempted and so a rich lattice of constructive modal theories still lies undiscovered.
The game is even more interesting than in the classical case: A satisfactory correspondence theory for constructive logic will not only cover the extensional aspects. It should also address the computational aspects in the sense of building CurryHoward correspondences between proof systems and λ-calculi. In other words, a correspondence theory for CK should not only relate theories and (Kripke) models but also logic and programming in the spirit of the propositions-as-types and proofs-as-programs paradigm. Some systems of constructive modal logic have been successfully investigated in this respect. Computational type theory [2, 30] , which links proofs in PLL/CL with terms in the computational λ-calculus, has found many applications, e.g. to accommodate non-functional ("impure") features [33] , in strictness analysis and partial evaluation [34, 35] or for constraint extraction [19, 20] just to name a few. PLL/CL is a specialised theory of CS4 which in turn is the logic of modal type theory [3, 16, 21, 5, 4] . Modal type theories have found use to deal with higher-order abstract syntax [36, 37] , meta-variables [38] , staged computations [39, 40] , distributed computing [31] , complexity theory [41] and much more. Recently, Nanevski [17] (see also [21, Sec. 9 .1]) has demonstrated the usefulness of combining CS4-style 3-types for capturing destructive updates with 2-types for dynamic binding.
Outside of PLL/CL or CS4 the proof-theoretic treatment of constructive 2 and 3 and their computational interpretation of modal proofs following the Curry-Howard Isomorphism (see, e.g. the discussion in [22] ) is still largely unexplored. While 2 seems well behaved, 3 poses problems.
Masini [29] presented a cut-free Gentzen system for CK + ¬3⊥ + 2C ⊃ 3C but only proofs in the 2-fragment have been turned into an associated λ-calculus [42] . Because of the deontic axiom 2C ⊃ 3C , the 3-fragment of Masini's system generates an infinity of 3-nested theorems of the form 3 , 33 , 333 or 3(3(3 ∧ 3 ) ∧ 3 ) or alternations 2323 , which form a profusion of proof constants stating the existence of implicit trees of worlds and functions on worlds. Clearly, without universal collapse axioms, like those in CS4, such proof terms are difficult to handle coherently in a logical λ-calculus that has to satisfy Church-Rosser, subject reduction and strong normalisation.
Yet, what about CK proper? In CK there are no such oracle proofs for constructive 3 existence statements. Each proof of 3 must be obtained by instantiating another hypothesis of form 3. For instance, any closed proof of a proposition 3C already amounts to a closed proof of C and any closed proof of 3C ⊃ 3D is essentially a closed proof of C ⊃ D together with the identity function on contexts. Pure CK offers more coherence at the outset, so that it may be a better candidate for a constructive "Ur"-calculus which would induce the known modal λ-calculi for computational and modal type theory as specialised algebraic models.
Another important result has been obtained by Bellin, de Paiva and Ritter in [22] presenting a Curry-Howard correspondence for CK proper, in the form of a natural deduction calculus with a category-theoretical semantics. However, the proposed computational interpretation has the disadvantage that the modalities 2 and 3 are not explained independently and locally in terms of introduction (constructors) and elimination (destructor) rules. The algebraic semantics of [22] is based on the traditional sequent rule Γ, C D → 2Γ, 3C 3D of logic K which (i) couples an occurrence of 3 on the right-hand side of with another occurrence of 3 on the left-hand side and (ii) introduces 2 globally on all context hypotheses Γ at the same time. This amounts to a global treatment of context which is not fully in the spirit of Gentzen and the ultimate objective reported in [22] In this paper we take a next step in this programme and present a sound and complete cut-free Gentzen calculus for CK with independent introduction and elimination rules for 2 and 3 as in Masini's work but for the pure system CK of [22] . Like the known calculi for CS4 concerning 2 [16, 4] our calculus is of local nature and does not need explicit worlds as labels. It is derived from the multi-sequent calculus [43] developed for multi-modal CK [44] . Though being cut-free, the system in [43] is not in proper (first-order) Gentzen format as its introduction and elimination rules involve sets rather than individual formulas. Also, the cut-elimination proof was obtained by semantic means. Thus, the system in [43] is not suited to be interpreted as a computational calculus of contexts. In this paper, we fix the problem and present a local interpretation of constructive 2 and 3 modalities. Each operator has its own intro and elim rule and both are dual similar to ∀ and ∃ in intuitionistic logic. Formally, our sequents for CK resemble the 2-sequents of Masini [45, 29] 
which feature sequences of contexts Γ i in the antecedent and sequences of contexts Φ j in the succedent. As Masini has shown these are a good structure for 2 making it possible to avoid the explicit labelling traditionally used to obtain cutfree representations in other intuitionistic modal calculi, notably IK [7] and other systems under Gabbay and Queiroz' labelled deduction approach [46] . However, in contrast to Masini, our sequents offer more fine-control for handling 2, 3 by introducing the notion of a focus. The focus singles out one of the context compartments Γ i in the antecedent as the "current local point of construction". This makes it possible to prevent using proofs of 2C without providing a reference to some constructable context in which C can be used. In this way, 2C does not entail 3C as in the deontic system of Masini. This solution is somewhat analogous to how intuitionistic predicate logic, or type theory, prevents the (classically valid) proof of ∀x.φ(x) ∃x.φ(x) which first instantiates ∀x.φ(x) to obtain φ(x) and then concludes ∃x.φ(x) with x as the existential 'witness': Type theory permits us to instantiate a proof ∀x.φ(x) by a term t to obtain φ(t) only if t is constructable in the current environment. If there are no constants in the logic then ∃x.φ(x) is not provable from ∀x.φ(x).
The addition of a 'focus' may be seen as a structural refinement of Masini's 2-sequents. However, in contrast to the purely proof-theoretic analysis of 2-sequents [29] , our sequents are equipped with a possible worlds semantics which allows us to obtain soundness and completeness theorems. While there is no proof provided in [29] for exactly what modal theory is generated by the 2-sequent system we can show that our system derives precisely the theory CK defined above. Moreover, based on the Kripke semantics and the 'focus', it is possible to show that the 2-sequents can be restricted to consist essentially of at most two context compartments on either side of the turnstile, i.e., n, m 2 in (4). Thus, they are of the same outer form as the sequents used in modal type theory [16, 4] .
Syntax and semantics of CK n
The multi-modal theory CK n is set in the propositional language
where A ∈ Var ranges over a set of propositional variables and R ∈ Lab over modal labels representing binary relations. The modalities may also be written with indices 2 R , 3 R in the tradition of classical modal logic [9] . Here, we prefer the notation ∀R, ∃R for modalities to avoid indices and remind us of their origin as quantifiers. Note, that this is the common notation for quantifiers as used in description logics [47] .
Definition 1.
(See [23, 43] .) A constructive interpretation or constructive model of CK n is a structure I = (
consisting of
• a non-empty set I of worlds, the frame universe in which each element represents a partially defined entity, process or state of knowledge;
• a refinement pre-ordering I , i.e., a reflexive and transitive relation on I ;
• a subset ⊥ I ⊆ I of fallible worlds closed under refinement and modal accessibility, i.e., x ∈ ⊥ I and x I y or x R I y implies y ∈ ⊥ I ; also, x ∈ ⊥ I implies there is y with x R I y; • an interpretation function · I mapping each modal label R ∈ Lab to a binary relation R I ⊆ I × I and each atomic proposition A ∈ Var to a set ⊥ I ⊆ A I ⊆ I which is closed under refinement, i.e., x ∈ A I and x I y implies y ∈ A I .
Constructive models I of CK n extend the classical two-valued models of K n by a pre-ordering I for capturing refinement between worlds and a notion of fallible entities ⊥ I for interpreting empty information. The refinement relation 
We will write I, x | C as an abbreviation for x ∈ C I . This is extended to sets Γ of propositions, i.e., I,
When there is no confusion we will identify I with · I and simply write , , ⊥ instead of I , I , ⊥ I .
We obtain the standard classical models of K n whenever is the identity relation and ⊥ empty. In general, the relation I, x | C spreads out the validity of C across many -related worlds, in the sense that if I, x | C and x y then I, y | C . At fallible worlds y ∈ ⊥ discrimination is switched off completely by making all propositions valid. This monotonicity of truth is the characteristic feature of intuitionistic semantics. Notice that the definitions of (∃R.C) I and (∀R.C) I corresponds to the readings (3) and (1), respectively. All the other clauses of Definition 2 make up the standard Kripke semantics of IPL [48] .
Apart from the philosophical importance of intuitionistic Kripke frames, partial information structures (⊥, ) have found widespread applications in Computer Science. This is not the place to review them. For illustration, we will consider just a few examples (see also [43] ) that suggest themselves in the context of knowledge representation. Moreover, we will show that IK4/FS4, IK5/FS5 and the deontic scheme are not universally valid in constructive models. We shall see later how they can be recovered if needed. Also we shall see how to interpret the other axioms of CS4. Example 1. The deontic axiom ∀R.A ⊃ ∃R.A is not sound in CK n , since it is already unsound in classical K n and by the fact that every model in K n is also a model in CK. Semantically this can be seen by observing that the classical non-serial counter model is in particular a constructive model: Take the reflexive one-world interpretation I = {0} such that 0 0 and R I = ∅ for modal labels R ∈ Lab. Putting ⊥ I = A I = df ∅ we have a constructive interpretation. Then, clearly 0 | ∀R.A since 0 has no R-successors but at the same time it means 0 | ∃R.A. 
Example 3.
A world x ∈ may be an abstraction of data records appearing in an abstract data context. Each refinement y of x has all the attributes of x and on those the same values, but possibly also additional attribute dimensions. E.g., x may be the result of suppressing information in an attempt to optimise calculations on a large data base. Every application of a projection on a data base table creates an abstraction in this sense. (a) . On the other hand, this choice cannot be resolved at the abstract level as there is no single uniform choice of the $2-attribute. This is reflected in the logic by the fact that ∃$2.
. Abstractions like this cannot be expressed in intuitionistic modal logics where 3 distributes over ∨ and ∃$2.
Regarding valid propositions, in Fig. 1 
Hilbert calculus for CK n
The Hilbert calculus is given in Table 1 . Part (a) shows the usual axioms for intuitionistic propositional logic [48] , specifically 1-2 for ⊃, 3-4 for ∧, 5-6 for ∨ and 7 for inconsistency ⊥. Part (b) of Table 1 lists the two principles ∃K , ∀K for universal and existential context quantifications following Wijesekera's modal rules presented in [12] . These come from generalised monotonicity depicted by the rules M 1 , M 2 below with the important property of having in the conclusion of each rule a universal quantifier over the context Γ :
Finally, the rules of Modus Ponens MP and Necessitation Nec are given in item (c) of Table 1 .
Let the symbol H denote Hilbert deduction, i.e., Θ H C if there exists a derivation C 0 , C 1 , . . . , C n such that C n = C and each C i (i n) is either a hypothesis C i ∈ Θ, or a substitution instance of an axiom scheme from Table 1(a), (b) or arises from earlier propositions C j ( j < i) through MP or Nec as in Table 1 (c). This is lifted to sets of propositions Φ, i.e., Θ H Φ in the usual way.
The Gentzen sequent calculus G-CK n
In [23] it was shown that the constructive interpretation constitutes an adequate Kripke model theory for CK and in [43] a sound and complete tableau-style calculus was presented for its multi-modal extension CK n which, however, is not suited for computational interpretations. We are now going to reconstruct this system as a cut-free Gentzen calculus for CK n which provides a starting point for extracting an associated λ-calculus. The new calculus, G-CK n , has the same local nature and symmetrical treatment of 2 and 3, in terms of left and right introduction rules corresponding to constructors and destructors of proof terms, as the calculi for computational and modal type theory, but without prescribing any additional axioms. Moreover, all the rules have a semantic interpretation as local constructions on Kripke worlds.
G-CK n sequents have the formΣ Ψ in whichΣ is the antecedent and Ψ is the succedent. Like the 2-sequents of Masini [29] both are sequences of sets of propositions in which the information is separated into individual scopes. But now these scope compartments are connected by named accessibility relations and we also add a focus marker. Specifically, a general antecedent looks likė
where S i ∈ Lab are modal labels. Each Γ i is a scope Γ i = {C i1 , C i2 , . . . , C im i } containing local assumptions C ij . As seen in (5) one of these scopes is distinguished by a special marker called the focus. The associated set of local assumptions Γ f is the scope in focus. The focus splits the antecedent into two partsΣ = Σ c Σ h , the context Σ c = Γ 1 S 2 Γ 2 S 3 · · · S f Γ f before the focus and the hypotheses Σ h = Γ f S f +1 · · · S n Γ n after the focus. It is useful to think of the focus marker as a binary operator on sequences of scopes. Note that the scope in focus Γ f logically belongs to both parts of the antecedent, i.e., the context and the hypotheses.
The context part Σ c of the antecedent represents the assumption that the scope in focus Γ f is accessible through a connected path S 2 , S 3 , . . . , S f of modal context switches passing through scopes Γ i (1 i < f ). Each Γ i specifies the information available in the respective scope. The focus marks the active scope relative to which the sequent's actual judgement Σ h Ψ is made. The judgement informally states that if the sequence of scopes specified by the hypothesis Σ h is constructable, then the sequence of assertion scopes specified by the succedent (6) in some modal labels R j ∈ Lab, is constructable, too. Just like with other (classical or non-classical) multi-sequent calculi, the notions of constructibility left and right of are dual: While the hypothesis sets Γ i in Σ h and their succession are to be taken in a conjunctive sense, the assertion sets Φ j and their succession in Ψ are interpreted disjunctively. This means that Ψ as in (6) is constructable if some scope Φ j (1 j m) is reachable (from the focus point) through a connected path R 2 , R 3 , . . . , R j so that at least one of the propositions D ∈ Φ j is true. Constructibility on the hypothesis side Σ h means that all scopes Γ i ( f i n) are reachable on a (single) connected path and all assumptions hold true at the respective scope position. The precise semantic interpretation is given in Definition 3 in Section 4.
The number of scope separators in Σ h to the right of the focus is called the length of the antecedentΣ and the number of separators in Σ c before the focus is called its depth. E.g., the contextΣ in (5) has depth f − 1 and length n − f . Thus, an antecedent with zero depth and zero length is a single setΣ = Γ . There is no need for a focus marker in the succedent Ψ since it always starts at the focus point of the antecedent. It is implicit and fixed to the first set Φ 1 . Accordingly, the succedent Ψ has no depth but only a length m − 1.
Note that our sequents have only one focus alignment and thus make essentially only one judgement. In contrast, the 2-sequents of Masini [29] have more coupling between antecedent and succedent in the sense that is implicitly repeated from left to right for every scope in Σ or Ψ up to the maximum of m and n, patching up with Γ i = ∅ and Φ j = ∅ as needed. Therefore, Masini's 2-sequents (for one modal label) are somewhat more expressive than ours. On the other hand, as we will see, this expressiveness is not needed to capture the mechanics of CK. Specifically, we will show that it suffices to consider sequents with at most two scopes on both sides, i.e., where n, m 2. Moreover, the explicit introduction of a focus and the possibility to implicitly shift antecedent and succedent against each other is useful to implement a reading of 2 and 3 which does not presuppose the deontic scheme 2C ⊃ 3C .
Before we can present the rules of the calculus to derive sequentsΣ Ψ we need to agree on a couple of meta-level syntactic conventions to handle sequents generically. To begin with, we will treat each scope Γ in the antecedentΣ (and similarly for Ψ ) as an unordered list without duplications, so that if C ∈ Γ then Γ is the same as Γ, C and C , Γ . This has the advantage that we do not need explicit structural rules for exchange and contraction implementing the meaning of the comma separator.
A similar abstraction applies to the focus separator. We may place the focus at the beginning of the respective local scope Γ as done in (5) but also write Γ to make it appear at the end. Furthermore, since the focus is a marking of the whole scope, it does not matter if we put it inside the scope so that, e.g., {A, B, C } = {A} {B, C } = {A, B} {C} = {A, B, C } or even {A, B} {C} = {C} {A, B} = {B, C } {A, C }, etc. In this sense Γ and Γ are the same as ∅ Γ and Γ ∅. Our rules for sequentsΣ Ψ and their semantics are invariant under such identifications treating just like a special comma in the set abstraction. This gives full freedom for splitting up antecedentsΣ at the focus scope. E.g., ifΣ = Γ 1 S {A, B, C } T Γ 2 thenΣ = Σ c Σ h in several ways:
Of course, at the level of scope sequences we enforce associativity of the separators S for breaking up a context at any point as in Σ = Σ S Σ where Σ and Σ are the corresponding sub-sequences. This includes the special case that one of the sub-sequences is empty. E.g., if Σ = is empty then Σ S Σ = Σ . This is not the same as Σ S ∅ keeping in mind the difference between an empty sequence and a singleton sequence consisting of an empty set of assumptions. We may assume that in a sequentΣ Ψ neither Σ nor Ψ will ever be empty, i.e., we have n, m 1 in (5) and (6). We will write Σ, C to say that the last scope contains C , i.e., Σ, C = Σ S Γ, C , where Σ is the initial sub-sequence of Σ without the final scope. If Σ is empty then of course Σ S Γ, C is the same as the singleton sequence Γ, C . Similarly, C , Σ means that C is in the first scope, i.e., C , Σ = Γ, C S Σ . Again, Σ may be the empty sequence in which case Γ, C S Σ = Γ, C . Finally, not surprisingly, Σ and Σ indicate that the focus is in the first and last scope of Σ , respectively, whileΣ says that the focus is somewhere inside Σ and we do not care about where.
The Gentzen calculus G-CK n consists of the rules given in Figs. 2 and 3 , separated into those dealing with the propositional connectives and those dealing with the modalities. The former, shown in Fig. 2 , are essentially the well-known multi-sequent version of Gentzen's LJ for intuitionistic logic [49] embedded into sequents with scope sequences on both sides of the turnstile. The binary operators ∧, ∨, ⊃ have right and left introduction rules, ⊥ only has a left introduction. Notice that all left rules ∧L i , ∨L, ⊃L, ⊥L require the operator to be introduced to appear in the context part of the antecedent, i.e., in the focus scope or to the left of it. Except for ∧L where it could be lifted, this constraint is essential to preserve soundness, as we shall see. Similarly, all the right rules ∧R, ∨R, ⊃R introduce the main operator in the first conclusion scope of the succedent. Again, this is crucial for soundness, except for rule ∨R which could be more liberal. Notice, since G-CK n satisfies weakening and contraction, the system where ∨R 1 and ∨R 2 are combined to form the rule is equivalent to our system.
The axiom rule Ax m combines both restrictions. It states that an assumption in the focus can be used to justify the same proposition in the conclusion at the focus scope.
The rules for modal operators in Fig. 3 warrant more detailed explanations and in the following we discuss them one by one. The rules are cast in the spirit of Gentzen and characterise each modal operator by way of a left and a right introduction rule. These exhibit the modalities ∀R and ∃R as internalisations of the scoping structure explicit in the separators R on the left and on the right sides of a sequent:
• Applying the right rule ∃R in forward direction introduces an existential modality ∃R.D on the right, wrapping up a R separator. Consider first the special case Ψ = ∅, i.e., the instanceΣ ∅ R D ⇒Σ ∃R.D. This says that if D is constructable one R step forward from the scope under the assumptionsΣ then ∃R.D is constructable at the current scope under the assumptionsΣ . This is the constructor rule for proofs of existential modalities. Considering the disjunctive semantics of assertions on the right of this inference can be extended by an arbitrary weakening Ψ as seen in Fig. 3. • The left introduction rule ∃L wraps up a separator S in the antecedent in terms of an existential ∃S. Again, let Σ 1 = ∅ and Σ = . Then ∃L becomes ∅ S C Ψ ⇒ ∃S.C Ψ stating that if Ψ is constructable from the assumption that C is accessible through relation S from the scope in focus, then Ψ is constructable under the assumption ∃S.C . The idea is that from any hypothetical proof of ∃S.C we can obtain S-access to a context scope where a hypothetical proof of C is available. Thus, ∃L is the destructor rule of existentials. The actual rule ∃L in Fig. 3 generalises this by a side assumption Σ 1 in the antecedent of both the premise and conclusion, and also by a weakening Σ in the conclusion. Note that ∃L is always applied at the scope in focus.
• The left rule ∀L introduces a universal modality ∀S.C into a context scope from an assumption C one scope to the right and reachable through modal label S. In the special instance where Σ 1 = ∅ and Σ 2 = this is the rule ∅ S C Ψ ⇒ ∀S.C S ∅ Ψ . This says that if Ψ is constructable under the assumption C in the current focus, which happens to be accessible from some outer context using an S-step, then it suffices to have the assumption ∀S.C in the outer scope in order to construct Ψ . This is justified because we may instantiate a hypothetical proof of the universal ∀S.C across S to give a proof of C . In this way the rule ∀L is the destructor for proofs of ∀ modalities. As seen in Fig. 3 this works under arbitrary side assumptions Σ 1 andΣ 2 . As we will see below it is important that the introduction rule is only applied left of the focus.
• The right introduction rule ∀R plays the role of a constructor of proofs for ∀ modalities. Fig. 3 permit weakening.
• Finally, consider the rule Ax f . It permits us to move the focus one position to the left across a separator S in the antecedent by adding a corresponding scope and separator on the right in the succedent, where the choice of the assertion set Φ in the fresh scope is arbitrary. This is a synchronous move to the left of the focus. Looking at the rule in backward direction, from the point of view of proof search, rule Ax f justifies one S step in the succedent by a corresponding S step from the antecedent. For instance, if Σ 1 = Φ = ∅, then Ax f reduces the task of deriving ∅ S Σ 2 ∅ S Ψ to that of finding a derivation ∅ S Σ 2 Ψ , which essentially eliminates S from the problem.
In this sense Ax f is for modal labels what Ax m is for propositions.
The rules in Fig. 3 [45, 29] . Our modal rules are refinements of those of [29] by an explicit focus marker that localises the point of construction and gives better control of the relative positions of antecedent and succedent. The rules enforce restrictions on the position of the active proposition relative to the focus marker. E.g., in ∃L and ∃R the existential propositions ∃S.C , ∃R.D must be at the focus. In ∀L the universal ∀S.C must be on the left and in ∀R the proposition ∀R.D is within the scope in focus. As we shall see below, removing these restrictions would be unsound for general constructive Kripke models. In particular, the deontic axiom 2C ⊃ 3C , which is unsound, is prevented by the focus restriction on ∀L.
Soundness
In this section we show that G-CK n is sound for CK n . We also discuss the role of the focus marker to achieve this and some natural rules for various extensions of CK n , specifically IK/FS, CS4, PLL/CL and the deontic system of Masini.
Theorem 1 (Soundness
The most convenient way to establish soundness is via the Kripke semantics. In [43] it was shown that CK n contains precisely the propositions valid in all constructive Kripke models as defined in Definition 2. Hence, it suffices to show that all rules of G-CK n are sound in the sense that they only generate valid sequents. It will be useful to rephrase validity in terms of refutability of sequents. • if α = a and Σ = Γ then I, a | Γ ;
Definition 3 (Refutability
• if α = a and Σ = Γ S Σ then I, a | Γ and for all a ∈ I such that a I a there exists b ∈ I with a S I b and b sat Σ ;
We say that a world a ∈ I refutes Σ , written a unsat Σ , 
whereΓ denotes the conjunction andΦ the disjunction of all propositions in Γ and Φ, respectively. A general sequenṫ Σ Ψ of the shape
or, more concretely, for sequents with two scopes in the antecedent and the succedent:
Notice the change betweenΓ ⊃ ∀S andΓ ∧ ∃S at the focus point in the antecedent and between the conjunctive combinationΓ in the antecedent and the disjunctive combinationΦ in the succedent. In particular notice that the translation involves all operators of the language. This is a difference to the interpretation of intuitionistic 2-sequents given in [29] which does not involve the diamond modality ∃. 
∀R.((A ∧ C ) ⊃ D) ∀L ∀R.A ⊃ ∀R.(C ⊃ D)
which is essentially an instance of axiom IK1/∀K . The other axiom IK2/∃K is hidden in rule Ax f . Specifically, the instance
Let us call a sequent of the form Γ Φ with depth 0 and length 0, in which Γ and Φ do not contain any modal operators, intuitionistic. It is easy to see that every derivation of an intuitionistic sequent only contains intuitionistic sequents and only involves logical rules from Fig. 2 . These are precisely the standard rules of the multi-sequent Gentzen system LJ [49] . Hence, CK n is a conservative extension of IPL. The intuitionistic restriction lies in the rule ⊃R which requires the succedent in its premise to be a single proposition D. As is well known, if we relax the rule to ⊃R * to read
Ψ , then we get back classical logic and a derivation of the Excluded Middle PrincipleΣ C ∨ ¬C .
Extensions of G-CK n

Deontic extension [29]
In Example 1 we have seen that the deontic axiom is not generally valid. By soundness, the sequent ∅ ∀R.A ⊃ ∃R.A is not derivable. The attempt to prove it yields the unique tree ?
∀R.C ∅ R C ∃R ∀R.C ∃R.C ⊃R ∅ ∀R.C ⊃ ∃R.C which cannot be completed. The left rule ∀L is not applicable at the open leaf because of the lack of a R successor in the antecedent across which the move of C in ∀R.C R ∅ over R to yield ∅ R C could be performed. This is analogous to the situation in intuitionistic predicate logic where the sequent ∀x.C ∃x.C is not derivable unless we assume all domains are non-empty. In G-CK we can obtain R-seriality by way of an extra rule and then complete the proof tree as follows:
The rule R-serial is sound in all constructive models that are serial, i.e., for which every world has an R-successor. As an axiom, R-serial is equivalent to assuming ∃R. .
Disjunctive Distribution FS4/IK4
We can now explain proof-theoretically why disjunctive distribution ∃R. ? 
Non-fallibility FS3/IK3
The nullary form of disjunctive distribution ∃R.⊥ ≡ ⊥, or equivalently ∃R.⊥ ⊃ ⊥, is not a theorem for general constructive models due to the possible presence of fallible worlds. In the proof system it is not derivable because ⊥L is only applicable to inconsistencies in the context, i.e., to the left of the focus. The only possible derivation tree ? ∅ R ⊥ ⊥ ∃L ∃R.⊥ ⊥ ⊃R ∅ ∃R.⊥ ⊃ ⊥ places the empty disjunction ⊥ as a hypothesis on the right of the focus. Under the focus restrictions this fails to justify ⊥ in the succedent, either by rule ⊥L or by Ax m . Of course, if we use a more general rule ⊥L * deriving all instances of Σ 1 R ⊥, Σ 2 Ψ then the above derivation for ∃R.⊥ ⊃ ⊥ can be completed. Like for Disjunctive Distribution there is an alternative for enforcing ∃R.⊥ ≡ ⊥ in terms of a right rule. We can add the rule R-infallible, as seen below, to do the job:
Observe that rule R-infallible deriving ¬∃R.⊥ is formally dual to R-serial which corresponds to axiom ∃R. . Both rules ⊥L * and R-infallible are sound for constructive models without fallible worlds.
Scheme FS5/IK5
The intuitionistic modal logic IK/FS [8, 6] to justify D in the antecedent. However, the rules of CK n do not permit this speculative move of the focus. They are single threaded with a single focus which commits us to apply ⊃L with the information available at this point. Note that we could derive the theorem with a modified left implication rule ⊃L *
which permits us to use an implication to the left of the focus without dropping R Σ 2 . The completed proof then is:
No surprise, ⊃L * is not sound for arbitrary constructive models. However, ⊃L * is valid for models satisfying the frame condition −1 ; R ; ⊆ R ; −1 .
CS4
Many applications, specifically modal type theories, are based on the constructive logic CS4 [3, 16] which extends CK (in a single modal label R, writing 3 and 2 rather than ∃R and ∀R) by the axiom schemes
CS4 is also called JS4 for Judgemental S4 [15] . As shown in [25] this logic is the CK theory of constructive models with a reflexive and transitive modal relation R which satisfies the frame condition R ; ⊆ ; R. These frame properties give rise to corresponding sequent rules seen in Fig. 4 which implement the CS4 axioms in G-CK as follows: 
Ax m
Soundness of 3T and 2T stem from reflexivity of R, while soundness of 34 and 24 arise from transitivity of R and the frame property R ; ⊆ ; R. Observe how G-CK reveals the symmetric nature of the axioms of CS4 and their universal role for handling context scopes on the left and on right of . We note that the G-CK-rule 34 (Fig. 4) is actually a rendering of the axiom scheme ∃R.(C ∨ ∃R.D) ⊃ ∃R.(C ∨ D) which is the "right" way to axiomatise transitivity of R in CK. It can be derived from the combination of the Hilbert axioms 3T and the simpler form of 34 as above.
Necessitation and lax logic PLL/CL
As we will see below, by cut admissibility, the calculus admits the rule of Modus Ponens, i.e., for every derivation [24, 30] where one replaces
encoding axiom D ⊃ ∀R.D which is sound in frames satisfying R ⊆ [25] . Given Ax * m we easily derive the tensorial strength
As a side remark we note that if we relaxed Ax m to become applicable to assumptions right of the focus, say Σ 1 R C , Σ 2 C , Ψ we would trivialise ∃R since then ∃R.C ⊃ C would become a theorem.
Completeness
In this section we show that the cut-free derivation system G-CK n given in Figs. 2 and 3 is complete for CK n . Furthermore, as it turns out, we only ever need at most two scopes on either side of the sequent turnstile. We show that the calculus enforces some structural invariants which make it possible to work with tight sequents (Def. 4) without losing completeness. This result highlights the local nature of reasoning in CK n .
To prove completeness we need some auxiliary facts on weakening and commutation of rules. Let us write Σ ⊆ Σ if Σ is a weakening of Σ in the sense that it has the same separators as Σ and each scope of Σ is a subset of the corresponding scope of Σ . This is defined inductively by the conditions (i) ⊆ and (ii) the succedent Ψ has length 1 and also contains exactly one proposition; (iii) all scopes of the antecedentΣ more than two places to the left of are empty.
In other words, a tight sequent has one of the shapes
where Ψ is either of the form D or ∅ R D. A derivation is called tight if all sequents appearing in it are tight.
Lemma 2.
(i) Proof. Using Lemma 2 we show how to simulate every Hilbert proof of CK n in G-CK n (see Sec. 2.1) using only tight sequents. Recall that CK n is the logic generated by the axioms of intuitionistic propositional logic IPL together with the two modal axiom schemes (R ∈ Lab)
and the rules MP of Modus Ponens and Nec R of Necessitation. Let us see how such Hilbert proofs can be translated into G-CK. First, we generate tight derivations ∅ C for all intuitionistic axioms C using the rules in Fig. 2 i.e., the fact that our system is closed under context weakening. Specifically we use thatΣ Ψ implies ∅ RΣ Ψ for all R ∈ Lab (preserving tightness). In particular, this implies that if ∅ D then ∅ R ∅ D and thus ∅ ∀R.D by rule ∀R. 2
Conclusion
In this work we present a constructive modal logic and its cut-free Gentzen calculus as a formal system to express context-dependency. The system is derived from a multi-sequent calculus for multi-modal CK, whose direct analogue in description logics is cALC as has been reported in [43] . The system exhibits sequents equipped with Kripke semantics which allowed us to obtain soundness and completeness theorems. It has been shown that other non-classical modal logics such as IK, CS4, PLL/CL, or Masini's deontic system of 2-sequents arise as specialised theories of CK.
In future work we aim at introducing proof terms for our Gentzen system, especially to extract proof terms/natural deduction rules for 2 and 3, as an extension of the simply typed lambda calculus that expresses context-dependent computations in structured data, e.g. computational knowledge bases or databases. We hope that such a system can constitute a formal grounding for a modally typed functional programming language that finds practical adoption in the domains of knowledge representation and database processing languages. For such applications it will be important that the semantic properties of the accessibility relations (so-called "roles" in Description Logics) can be adjusted flexibly, rather that being hardwired as in CS4, PLL/CL and other specialised modal type theories like [31, 21] .
• α sat Σ, C iff α sat Σ and a f | C ;
• a unsat D, Ψ iff a unsat Ψ and a | D;
• Consider rule ∨L and let α = a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a f be a sequence of infallible worlds so that α unsat Σ 1 , 21 , from which it follows easily that α unsat 21 and hence α unsat Σ 1 , C 2 ,Σ 2 Ψ . Thus, at least one of the two premise sequents of ∨L must be refuted by α. Note that this depends on the fact that the disjunction C 1 ∨ C 2 occurs in the context of the antecedent, i.e., before or at the focus. Otherwise, if C 1 ∨ C 2 refers to unknown worlds of the hypothesis, forward from the last a f , then the case analysis cannot be done. We have seen (Section 5.2) that such a forward case analysis would make
Rule ∧R needs the conjunction it works on to be present at the focus point, i.e., in the succedent context directly next to the turn-stile. 
which has the same structure as D except that some of the succedents have changed to Ψ . Similar inductive arguments apply in case of the other left rules. The point is that all left rules are ignorant of the succedent which could be ⊥ or Ψ
and can be applied arbitrarily left of the focus. This proves (ii).
(iii) We show that every instance of ∃L can be pushed up the derivation tree (towards the leaves) until it hits an instance of Ax f . Furthermore, it is easy to check that these transformations preserve tightness. Let D be a derivation which ends in an arbitrary instance of ∃L:
Consider the last rule in D. If it is Ax m or ⊥L then we can derive the conclusion Σ 1 , ∃R.C Σ 2 Ψ straight away and thereby eliminate ∃L. The resulting derivation tree has height 1 which is strictly less than the original D which consisted of at least two rules in sequence. All left rules ∧L, ∨L, ⊃L at the end of D can be swapped with ∃L, e.g., take ⊃L . . .
Similar commutations are possible for ∧L and ∨L. Next take a look at ∃L as the last rule, which means we have two ∃L in sequence. The top one overrides the one below as follows: 
because ∀R.D is introduced by ∀L from D to the right of the focus. Such an application is not needed and would not directly commute with ∃L. Finally we come to study the right rules at the end of D. It is not difficult to see that all the right rules ∧R, ∨R, ∃R must commute downwards as they are ignorant of the antecedent. The right rule ∀R can be used to eliminate ∃L completely:
This completes the proof of (iii) of Lemma 2. Observe that this inductive process of pushing ∃L upwards in the tree does not introduce extra rules and thus does not increase the height of the tree, as required. 
Here ∀L and cut commute as follows: 
Tightness is not affected since the weakening only enlarges non-empty scopes. In a similar way we proceed with ∨L, ⊃L, ∀L. where cut is applied inductively to derivations D and E of strictly smaller height. Since weakening is done in the two last scopes before the turnstile, tightness is preserved. 2
